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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The Democrats and Republicans have been having big meetings
during the last few weeks. A number of noted speakers have been
out to address the respective clubs. General J. Tandy Ellis and
Hon. Pres. Kimball were the speakers at the last meeting of- the
Democratic club. A large crowd of young voters were present and
greatly appreciated the remarks of the speakers.
The college of law opened this year with an enrollment of one
hundred and twenty-eight students. Dean Lafferty is much pleased
with the freshman class. There is not a special student in the class.
The Bobs Merrill Company, publishers, of Indianapolis, have
presented the students of the law department with Eliots' The Work
of the Advocate, to be competed for in a contest to be conducted by
the Law Journal.. This gift from the Bobs Merrill Company is much
appreciated by the students and the contest promises to be a warm
one.
The W. H. Anderson Company, of Louisville, have moved from
209 Walker Building to larger and more commodious quarters at
238 Fifth Street. A representative of the company called at the department a few days ago and placed C6chran's Law Lexicon on sale
with Mr. Back, the student book dealer.
.0

THE GOVERNOR'S EXECUTIVE POWER
Dr. Goodnow, President of Johns-Hopkins University, in his
authoritative work, "The Principles of the Administrative Law of
the United States," speaks of the American conception of the executive power in the latter part of the eighteenth century (which would
be the period of 1775 to 1800) as exemplified in the early state
government, in these sentences: "The American conception of the
executive power prevailing at the time of the adoption of the United
States' Constitution corresponded with that part of the exedutive
power which has been called political. * * * The care of the
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foreign relations was not in the Governor's hands, simply because
during the colonial period the mother country, and during the existence of the states as sovereign states, the Continental Congress
attended to the matter. To a similar reason is due the fact that the
State Governor did not have very extensive administrative powers.
Administrative matters outside of those directly connected with the
military powers of the Governor had not been attended to by the
central (state) government, but in accordance with English principles of local government, by various officers in the local districts
of the state who were regarded as local in character and who often
at the same time discharged judicial functions. These officers were
to act in accordance with laws which descended into the most
minute details. Thus, executive instructions and orders were unnecessary. * * * The facts were the same in the branch of administration known as internal affairs. * * * There was thenleft
only one branch of administration in which the central colonial government had any important powers to exercise; this was the adminis* * The legislature claimed and
tration of the central finances.
obtained the power to vote all supplies that the government could
obtain, to specify in the appropriation acts for what purposes and in
what amounts the money it had raised §hould be expended, and to
designate the officer who was to have charge of its collection and
disbursement. Further, the localities attended to a great many matters which were of interest to the state as a whole, and paid the expenses which attention to these matters necessitated, so that even the
financial administration of the central government was not, on the
whole, important. * * * The power of appointment, which has
often been regarded as distinctly an executive power, was treated
differently in different states, but the conception that it belonged
to the Governor in the case of other than judicial and local officers
was not very clear, * * * One fact further deserves mention;
that is, the Governor possessed neither in the colonial nor in the original state government any general ordinance power even to supplement existing law."
A careful reading of these extracts will indicate that the conception of executive power in the light of which we must read the
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lines and between the lines of the early state constitutions, was only
partial as compared with the conception of sovereign executive
power inherent in an independent state. So that, when we consider
the words of the Kentucky Constitution, section 69: "The supreme
executive power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a chief
magistrate, who shall be styled the 'Governor of the Commonwealth
of Kentucky,' " we must undestand the words "the supreme executive power" to impart only that conception of executive power which
was entertained at the time they were written. What is the extension
of that power can only be determined at present, with reference to
a particular application. Perhaps it can only be measured nd defined
by an enlightened and progressive public opinion. The courts, in the
few instances in which the words "executive power" have been before them for construction, have generally held that they have very
little meaning. In an early case, the Supreme Court of Vermont
said: "There are no powers incident to the executive character of
a chief magistrate of this state (Vermont), unless they are obviously
necessary to carry into effect some of the powers expressly given."
This was an early decision, and, of course, its import is to be found
in the words "incident to." The court was speaking of the power, if
any, inherent in the office of Governor. It was admitted that the
Governor had such powers as "are obviously necessary to earry into
effect some of the powers expressly given."
Professor Goodnow says: "The constitutions of most o the
states of the American union, like the Constitution of. the United
States, vest the executive power in a chief executive. The meaning of
the words 'executive power' in this connection is the same as is
that of the same words used in the Constitution of the United States
with reference to the President. That is, little if any power is to
be regarded as vested in the Governor as a result of the grant to
him of the executive power. In order to find out exactly what is the
position of the Governor in the system of government adopted in
any one of the states of the American Union, we have to look through
the Constitution of that state for the powers which are specifically
and expressly granted to him. " 4 1 For the state courts have
not derived, as has the Supreme Court of the United States, any very
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large powers from such a general power or duty as to see that the
laws be faithfully executed. In other words, the principle of narrow
construction is more commonly adopted with regard to the powers
of the Governor than with regard to those of the President." If it
were not a fact, it would be inconceivable that the doctrine of strict
construction, whose only justification and application were in defense of the states against the imaginary encroachment of the federal
jurisdiction, should apply to the authority of an officer of the state.
This false use has clogged the whole system. No doubt, the explanation is that it was never so conceived, but was overlooked. The
public mind was directed solely at the relation of the federal power
to the state power, and political leadership was not developed in
respect of the internal affairs of the state. Surely the time has
come when we can grasp the enormity of this error. Questions of
federal and.state relations have been settled; our domestic concerns
are calling more loudly for wise leadership than did ever that relationship.
In Beard's "American Government and Politics," it is said:
"The state constitution generally vests the 'executive power' in the
Governor and charges him to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed. In the enforcement of the law, the Governor has to deal
with private persons and with the public officials. In the former
instance he acts directly in important matters, by ordering the
state's attorney to proceed in the proper court against offenders;
or, when there is a riot or other disorder too serious for the regular
processes of the courts, he may declare martial law in the region
affected and employ the militia of the state." In other words, it
is the view of Professor Beard that the grant of "executive power"
confers upon the Governor the power to act in vindication of the law
and authority of the Commonwealth either by resort to the procedure, judgment and execution of the court, through the attorney
general or by resort to force when that is required. He says further:
"In no branch of the state government have we.departed further
from the example set by the first State Constitutions than in the executive department. This has been due in part to social and economic
changes which have multiplied administrative offices, and in part to a
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growing distrust of the legislature and an increasing confidence in
the Governor. In their contest against British dominion, the colonists
had used their legislatures with great effect against the provincial
governors, and it was only natural that, after securing independence,
they should have regarded the executive with great jealousy, and
looked rather to the legislature as the safeguard of their liberties.
At the outset, therefore, the Governor was a mere nonentity, or at
best a servant of the legislature; but from this position of political
insignificance, the office has been gradually raised by the addition of
new powers and duties, until today, the Governor of the state
posesses a constitutional and administrative authority of no mean
proportions; and when he becomes, as he may, the representative of
great popular interests, he not only overshadows the legislature, but
sometimes springs into prominence as a national figure."
Upon the same line, and carrying the general conclusion to still
further lengths, extracts from "The New American Government and
its Work," by Mr. James T. Young, Professor of Public Adiministration, Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of
Pennsylvania, are most entertaining and enlightening. The most
modern of the modernists could not ask anything more practical and
breezy. Mr. Young is stimulating to the point of intoxication. He
says: "The state executive is slowly struggling upward into the
same position of leadership that has already been won by the President. For many generations the Governor was a mere figurehead,
because in colonial days he had been the 'royal executive' and, as
such, the means of royal oppression and tyranny. 'When the colonies
became states in the Revolution, they immediately stripped the office
of its real authority and left it that curious anomaly which it has
since remained until the most recent years, a post of much honor
but little power."
"The Governor's personality influences his legislative control; if
he is a natural leader and has a hold on the people he may draw up
a strong program of popular measures and, concentrating public attention upon these by an open and aggressive campaign of speechmaking and public interviews, he may bring such pressure to bear
on the legislature as to force his program through. Many successful
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Governors have done this, among them, Cleveland, Roosevelt, Hughes,
Lafollette, Johnson, Cummins, Wilson, and others. Instead of submitting to the advice and commands from 'higher up,' they have
gone direct to the people and have won. It is precisely this appeal
to the voters that determines the strength of the Governor, and
brings the office to the plane of real influence.
Mr. Young quotes Finley and Sanderson's work, "The American Executive," as follows: "While all these ex parte answers (to
letters of enquiry sent to Governors as to their influence in securing
legislation) indicate with one or two exceptions a disposition on
the part of legislatures to follow executive suggestion, it is apparent
even from these letters that it is not a servile following, and it is
plainly stated or intimated by two or three that they both follow an
imperative public opinion, the Governor having the first opportunity
to respond, and so giving unintentionally the impression of leading,
whereas, he, too, but follows. It is apparent, too, that the Chief
Executive has found a way of compelling legislation, while punctiliously observing the legislative limitations of his office; that is, by appealing to public opinion to make itself felt in the legislature. There
is certainly no menace in the power of the Chief Executive of the
Commonwealth. He has too little. Greater centralization of administrative power and unity of effort are here desirable."
Mr. Young says: "As Chief Executive of the State, the Governor is required 'to see that the laws are faithfully administered.'
He receives complaints from citizens, supervises the work of the
heads of department, represents the State in the relations with the
other Commonwealths and with the National Government. As a
rule, however, he is unable to watch the various departments as
closely as he should, because of the loose and unsystematic way in
which the offices are grouped, and, unless an official is guilty of
serious maladministration or dishonesty, he is not apt to attract the
unfavorable notice of the chief. * * * Although a Governor
may not compel an elected official to perform his duties, nor force
any fixed policy upon the great mass of boards and offices which
make up the chaos of State administration, he does possess one power
which is often used effectively to enforce the general, regulative laws
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of the State, viz.: his control over the general attorneyship. That
official is usually in closest personal and political association with
the Governor and controls the prosecuting machinery of the central
state government. In important conflicts between the State and the
organized interests opposing regulation, his office can be used to
enforce the laws in such a way as to command respect for the State
administration. No corporation today enters such a conflict except as
a last resort. In this way the chief law officer of the State has become
a tower of strength to the executive.
"In theory the Governor oversees all officials, but in practice
this is impossible. Modern governments are much like machinery;
there is in each the same tendency to needless friction, the same
necessity for accurate adjustment of the wearing parts, and even the
same inert inclination to 'run down' unless constantly impelled by
that expansive force which in physics is called steam, in politics
public opinion. But this force, to be effective, must be concentrated.
It cannot be trivially or indiscriminately 'squirted' at any or all
parts of the governmental machine, causing them to work in unison;
it must be guided and led along direct straight lines. This is the
rightful function of the Chief Executive, he should represent the
guiding force of public opinion, he must personify the people in
their political feelings. 0 * " We are too prone to say that all
depends on the personality of the chief, that if he is an energetic,
capable and honest man, his spirit will in some measure dominate the
whole administrative force, while if he is incapable, no amount of
'system' will produce results. Such a statement is only half true, for
a 'system' is the means through which the influence of the chief
makes itself steadily and regularly felt.
"If the Governor ruled his party he would be the strongest
influence in the State, for the control of the party and of the government are inseparable; no one can be the real head of the latter unless he is also the party leader. Glancing over the principal states we
find that only in the rarest exceptions does the Governor occupy
this position; almost invariably he is under the thumb of a great
party chieftain who is 'the power behind the throne,' and who either
prefers to occupy a seat in the United States Senate or not to hold
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office at all. This man is the State administration. * * * Naturally he prefers to place in the Governor's chair a person who
will be agreeable to his wishes, who will consider the party interests
and, especially, who will help to build up the leader's influence
within the party. It is clear that a Governor who is young, ambitious
and determined to seek power for himself is not desired by 'the
chief,' who much prefers a man advanced in years, or of satisfied ambitions, and amiable qualities-in short, a man of the 'honored citizen' type. Such was for many years the political position and influence of the State Executive-a nominal authority controlled by a
'kingmaker,' who was the real head of the State.
"Into this peculiar political situation a new factor has entered
in the shape of the demand for greater State activity. * * *
The Governor springs into greater prominence after every legislative
attempt at regulation; with the adoption of factory, health, pure
food, corporation laws, and a host of other measures his nominal
power increases, until a point is reached where he can no longer withstand the temptation to assert some slight degree of independence and
feel himself indeed, as in name, the Chief Executive. If he is a strong
man or a consummate politican, or if the conditions of the moment
prove especially favorable, he subordinates the State executive offices, one after the other to his own control, and even reaches out towards the legislature to form a mutual understanding or alliance
with the party leaders, to become the real head of his party. * * *
This is the significance of the constant turmoil and political unrest
in our Commonwealth administration; we are evolving a responsible form of State government."
It is apparent from these practical views, just from the press,
that the changed conditions, economic and social, of the present
period call for and are getting in the State Governor something
far more active and efficient than the ancient and eloquent, benevolent and esteemed, conventional and innocuous "honored citizen."
The matter was clearly stated with reference to the President some
years ago by the Attorney General of the United States. He said
that the President "is limited in the exercise of his powers by the
Constitution and the laws, but it does not follow that he must show
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a statutory provision for everything he does. The government could
not be administered upon such contracted principles. The great outlines of the movements of the executive may be marked out and
limitations imposed upon the exercise of hip powers. Yet there are
numberless things which must be done which cannot be anticipated
and defined, and are essential to useful and healthy action of government." The executive office is now, of necessity, a potential power
house and not a vault for entombing worn out theories. The occupant
is charged and empowered to take notice and to initiate.
The growth of the English Constitution from Magna Charta to
the Declaration of Independence was in the evolution of the principle that the administration should be an arm through which the
will of the people might act, but which should have no power of
oppressive action of itself. That is, the struggle was, not against the
administrative action of the executive, but against the absolute and
arbitrary power which he might assume under the guise of his prerogative. To that end two expedients were devised: (1) Much of the
function of administration was withdrawn from his control and reposed in local officers. (2) His prerogative was reduced so that in
performing the function of administration he was required to act
indirectly, through other officers not immediately dependent upon
his appointment. For instance, the executive secured faithful execution of the law through a civil action, or, in criminal cases, through
a prosecution in the courts; or through performance of the act required and the collection of the costs through an action at law; or
through summary but orderly and prescribed proceedings in revenue
matters; or, infrequently, by the application of physical force in the
sanitary administration, in the destruction of dangerous property,
and in the abatement of nuisances. These and other instances will
show that the executive's exercise of power was subjected during
that period to a curtailment in application, and to the limitation
upon his prerogative, that in many instances he must first obtain the
process of a court or other tribunal. In other words, if the executive
sought to proceed in the execution of the laws as far as depriving
a citizen of life, liberty, or property, he must proceed in accordance
with the due process required by the common law or the statutes.
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Beyond this, there seems to have been very slight, if any, restraint
imposed upon the executive except in those instances in which the
power of direct administrative action was reposed in local officers,
such as sheriffs, constables, justices of the peace, and specially designated boards and commissions. Thus it appears that in 1776, the
ideal of the executive was an officer without any prerogative inherent in his person, without power to act directly in many particular instances of administrative activity, without power to deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property unless through a due process
prescribed by the legislature or the common law, but with full power
to initiate and prosecute any proceeding required for the execution
of the laws, whether by influence brought to bear upon the officer or
private citizen, or through the judgment and process of a court
or other tribunal. The difficulty is not in the conception nor in its
statement, but in its instances and modes of application.
In the constitutional system of Kentucky, all these provisions
and limitations have been expressly established and confirmed: (1)
The executive has no prerogative inherent in his person. (2) Many
direct administrative acts are reposed in local officers, boards and
commissions. (3) The state may not, in the execution of the laws, deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. (4) Subject to these, the executive is charged and authorized
to use all means necessary and proper in his discretion to exercise
care that the laws are faithfully executed, and the military arm of
the state has been made subject to his order to sustain him if it
should be necessary.
It will follow as a necessary consequence that whenever the
honor, and the peace and dignity of the Commonwealth, and, also,
the political rights and peace, safety, happiness, lives, liberties, and
property of the citizens to which they are entitled under the laws
are openly and contumaciously violated by either officers or citizens,
but in such cases there is no remedy provided by express enactment
or the common law through prescribed procedure which may be
invoked by the people as of right, then, in such cases, the only
remedy lies through the exercise of the supreme executive power of
the Commonwealth which has been reposed in the Governor.
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In consideration of all which the following propositions would
seem to be self evident:
(1.) That the sovereignty, although not the entire sovereign
power of the Commonwealth, is lodged in the chief magistrate.
(2.) That provision and care for the peace, safety, happiness,
the protection of property and the general welfare of the people in
respect of these within the limits of the function of government
are entrusted by the people to the watchful prevision and jealous
concern of the sovereignty of the state.
(3.) That in order that such watchful prevision, and jealous
concern may be faithfully exercised for the security of the people
against the absolute and arbitrary use of power by those in whom
it has been reposed, the people have ordained and expressly authorized and enjoined upon the chief magistrate that he "shall take care
that the laws are faithfully executed."
(4.) That the people are in the enjoyment of many rights and
are entitled to thWe observance of many reciprocal duties which have
not been reduced to exact definition, and of which the enforcement
and redress are not regulated and have not been prescribed through
any formulated action or due procedure of law.
(5.) That power has been conferred upon the Governor and
his office has been instituted to the end that he may perform all the
acts necessary and proper for the application and faithful execution
of the laws, which acts are not specifically provided for and entrusted to other offices; and that he may act at his discretion in all
matters necessary and proper to be done in order to secure to the
people the full enjoyment of all the rights and reciprocal duties entrusted to the care and protection of government of which they are
possessed, which are not reduced to definition and a prescribed form
of procedure, and which are not entrusted to the care of any other
specified office or magistracy by express law or custom.
(6.) That decent and orderly access to the sovereignty of the
Commonwealth is of right, and necessary and proper in order that
a free and outspoken people may obtain relief from 'the righteous
sense of oppression.and grievance.
(7.) That in the performance, and necessary and proper to
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the exercise of the political function so conferred upon the Governor,
the following and many other pgwers, rights and reciprocal duties
are entrusted to his jealous care and watchfulness
He has the power to institute enquiry as to the faithful execution
of the laws in order that he may take care.
He has the power to hear complaints and to receive addresses
and petitions and remonstrances.
He has the power to assemble the people of municipalities for
conference and enquiry
He has the power of visitation to the peoples of municipalities
for enquiry and conference.
He is the spokesman of the Commonwealth and the expounder of
the rights of the people and of humanity
He has the power to make communications and give information
and warning to the people and to officers.
His power to take action is commensurate with his power to
make enquiry
Through hin the sovereignty of the Commonwealth is made accessible to the people.
He is to take care to hear patiently and with benevolent concern
all just grievances of the people.
He is to take care that the opportunity to approach the sovereignty in an orderly and decent manner is not made difficult to
the end that the Commonwealth may escape reproach. In a republic,
decent, orderly and respectful access to the sovereignty is matter of
right and not of grace.
His power to confer and advise with the people extends to occasions of political and social upheaval as well as occasions of strife
and violence.
He is to take all care to reduce and remove discord, disaffection
and commotion among the people, and to prevent revolution.
While the general conception of the American Governor's function is that it is purely political and static, not executive, and while
contumely has been visited upon the American Governor in that regard and it has been assumed that he is negligible as having no
power in execution, yet the Constitution of Kentucky provides ex-
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pressly in section 69: "The supreme executive power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a chief magistrate who shall be styled
'The Governor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.'"
Under the grant of supreme executive power the Governor of
Kentucky has supreme power to act in taking care that the laws
be faithfully executed in so far as the power to act in a defined case
has not been conferred specifically upon some other office.
He has the power to cause the sovereignty of the Commonwealth,
either in his person or in that of another by his commission and direction, to appear before all tribunals and constituted authorities, in
virtue of the prerogative of sovereignty, there to make motions and
institute proceedings which may be necessary and proper to vindicate the honor and dignity and power of the Commonwealth and to
restore to the people the full enjoyment of rights and duties of which
they have been deprived.
In his own person, or through the Attorney General at his direction, he may cause the sovereignty to appear by right of prerogative before the mayor and commissioners of the municipalities of
the state to make motions and institute proceedings which are indicated as appropriate and proper in the performance and execution
of the duty to take care.
He has the power to refer petitions for redress of grievances to
the special officers to whom the power of redress has been particularly entrusted by the Constitution or laws.
His power to act is supreme, and his acts are not subject to the
review and control of the courts except in those matters which are
excepted from -his discretion and are reduced to definition and a
prescribed form of due process.
His power to act extends to animadversion upon, criticism of,
and warning to officers of administration in the state and in localities
in respect of the faithful execution of the laws.
His responsibility of office calls for and requires that he seek
and obtain reliable information as to just grievances and the state
of public feeling in the Commonwealth and in localities through
whatever means and channels his discretion may point out. These
will naturally include private conference and newspapers, but above
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all, and more reliable than all, a visitation to the people themselves
m public assemblage, there to hear petitions, addresses and remonstrances decently and respeetly proffered.
Petitions, addresses and remonstrances proffered to him in the
capacity of one invested with the power of government upon application for redress of grievances or other proper purposes, whether
upon the assembling of the people together in a peaceable manner
for their common good or upon other proper occasions are privileged.
(8.) That no orderly and due procedure has been prescribed,
for instance, and no authority or magistracy has been indicated in
the express laws of Kentucky by and through which the people of
the city of Lexington are empowered, as a matter of right and not of
grace, to apply for redress and institute and compel proceedings
to effect the removal from office of the police judge.
(9.) That if the power of removal from office of the police
judge is vested in the mayor and commissioners, nevertheless it is
provided that the motion for removal may be made only upon the
initiative of one or more of the commissioners. Whence the people
may not move for the removal of the police judge and secure action
by the commissioners as of right, but only as matter of grace, dependent upon the arbitrary will of the mayor and commissioners.
(10.) That the provision of the law which restrains the exercise by the mayor and commissioners of the jurisdiction to hear and
adjudge a proceeding for the removal of the polied judge to occasions when the action is initiated by one or more of the members of
the body which is to hear and adjudge upon the motion, confers
absolute and arbitrary power, excludes the people from the full
and untrammeled enjoyment of their liberties under the Constitution
and laws, and is in derogation of their right to have the benefit of
this law faithfully administered in their behalf.
LYMAN CHALKLEY.

